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ABSTRACT 
While the human as a sensor concept has been utilised extensively for the 
detection of threats to safety and security in physical space, especially in 
emergency response and crime reporting, the concept is largely unexplored in 
the area of cyber security. Here, we evaluate the potential of utilising users as 
human sensors for the detection of cyber threats, specifically on social media. 
For this, we have conducted an online test and accompanying questionnaire-
based survey, which was taken by 4,457 users. The test included eight realistic 
social media scenarios (four attack and four non-attack) in the form of 
screenshots, which the participants were asked to categorise as “likely attack” 
or “likely not attack”. We present the overall performance of human sensors 
in our experiment for each exhibit, and also apply logistic regression and 
Random Forest classifiers to evaluate the feasibility of predicting that 
performance based on different characteristics of the participants. Such 
prediction would be useful where accuracy of human sensors in detecting and 
reporting social media security threats is important. We identify features that 
are good predictors of a human sensor’s performance and evaluate them in 
both a theoretical ideal case and two more realistic cases, the latter 
corresponding to limited access to a user’s characteristics 
Keyword:  —Social media, computer security, semantic attacks, phishing, 
social engineering, human as a sensor. 
 
 2 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Heartfield, R and Loukas, 
G. (2015). Predicting the performance of users as human sensors of security 
threats in social media. International Journal on Cyber Situational 
Awareness, Vol. 1, No. 1, ppxx-yy 
 
Biographical notes:  
 
Ryan Heartfield received his BSc degree from the University of Greenwich 
in 2011 in computer systems and networking. He is currently a network 
architect in the UK public sector and is a Cisco Certified Design Professional. 
Since 2014 he has been working towards a PhD in the CSAFE group of the 
Computing and Information Systems of the University of Greenwich. His 
research interests include semantic social engineering, cyber physical attacks, 
software-defined networks, cloud computing and network security. 
 
Dr. George Loukas is a Senior Lecturer in Cyber Security at the University of 
Greenwich, UK. He is principal investigator for several large-scale EU and 
UK research projects, ranging from the security of autonomous vehicles, to 
secure collaboration of communities and law enforcement agencies, and to 
bridging emotion research with cyber security in the context of smart home 
environments. Dr. Loukas has a PhD in Network Security from Imperial 
College. His research interests include cyber-physical attacks, network 
security, distributed systems, emergency management, semantic social 
engineering and digital forensics. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of the human as a sensor has been used extensively and 
successfully for the detection of threats and adverse conditions in physical 
space. Examples include diagnosing a city’s noise pollution (Y. Zheng et al., 
2014), road traffic anomalies (B. Pan et al., 2013) monitoring water 
availability (E. Jurrens et al., 2009), neighborhood watch schemes (T. Bennett 
et al., 2006), detecting unfolding emergencies (M. Avvenuti et al., 2016) and 
generally augmenting the situational awareness of first responders through 
social media (S. K. Boddhu et al., 2013). Yet, rather surprisingly the concept 
is very new in relation to detecting and reporting threats in cyber space. We 
are aware of only one very recent example of research geared specifically 
towards phishing attacks (N. Stembert et al, 2015). Here, we take the first 
steps towards exploring the applicability of the concept more generally by 
testing the reliability of human users as sensors of security threats. Our focus 
is on threats to social media. We have conducted a large-scale online 
experiment where we have asked 4,457 users to distinguish between attacks 
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and non-attacks on different online usage scenarios presented to them as 
visual exhibits. The focus of this paper is the analysis of the performance of 
human users as threat sensors with four examples of social media attacks and 
four examples of legitimate social media usage. Also, complementing 
previous research on predicting whether a particular attacker will be 
successful in their attack (A. Filippoupolitis et al., 2014; S. Kapetanakis et al. 
2014), here we identify features and models for predicting whether a 
particular user will successfully detect an attack. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
Stembert et al., (2015) have very recently proposed combining a reporting 
function with blocking and warning of suspicious emails and the provision of 
educative tips, so as to harness the intelligence of expert and novice users in 
detecting email phishing attacks in a corporate environment. Initial 
experimental results of their mock-up have been encouraging for the 
applicability of the human as a sensor concept in this context. Here, we focus 
on the detection capability of the users by evaluating the performance of a 
large number of users of different profiles and for a wider range of attacks 
than only phishing emails. That is because before building a system that 
depends extensively on a particular type of sensors (and the human sensor is 
no exception), one needs to be aware of their overall reliability and to be able 
to predict how well they will perform in different conditions (in this case, 
with regards to the profiles of the users and the type and difficulty of attacks 
they are expected to detect and report). 
 
Specifically, in relation to social media, it is particularly important to be able 
to tell to what extent users can correctly detect and report deception-based 
security threats (R. Heartfield and G. Loukas, 2016). In this respect, the 
related work on user susceptibility to phishing and other semantic social 
engineering attacks is highly relevant. Predicting whether a user will be 
deceived into clicking on a fraudulent link or not has traditionally been 
studied in the realm of behavioural science, where different studies have 
found that higher degrees of normative, affective and continuance 
commitment, obedience to authority and trust (M. Workman, 2008), 
submissiveness (I. M. A. Alseadon, 2014), neurotic behaviour (T. Halevi, 
2013) and conscientiousness (T. Halevi et al., 2015) all correlate with high 
susceptibility to phishing. Also, research by J. G. Mohebzada et al. (2012) has 
reported openness, positive behaviour (e.g., use of positive language) and 
high levels of conversationalist activity as predictors of vulnerability to an 
online social network bot. However, such behavioural features are rarely 
practical if the aim is to predict a user’s ability to detect attacks within a 
technical platform. For instance, how would a system measure 
conscientiousness or submissiveness in real-time, automatically and 
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ethically? Similarly, a number of research studies have reported that female 
participants were found to be more susceptible to phishing attacks than male 
participants (T. Halevi et al., 2015; S. Sheng et al, 2010; M. Blythe et al., 
2011; J. Hong et al., 2009), but again this is not a predictor that could be used, 
for instance, in a corporate environment, as it would amount to 
discrimination. Instead, more practical is to know whether users have 
previously received training on social media security or generally on security 
threats, which is consistently seen as a useful predictor of their ability to spot 
them (P. Kumaraguru et al, 2009), albeit to a varying degree. 
 
Here, we utilise the literature to identify a first set of predictors of a user’s 
ability to detect deception-based attacks and using statistical analysis we 
select the most relevant among them for different environments. We extend 
the scope beyond phishing and spear-phishing by including fake apps and 
QRishing, and measure the ability of users to detect them and the ability of 
our statistical models to predict whether they will. As the longer-term aim is 
to incorporate prediction to a technical platform, we are primarily interested 
in predictors that can be considered as practical, in the sense that their value 
can be provided or measured in real-time, automatically and ethically. 
 
3 METHDOLOGY 
We have conducted a quantitative on-line experiment implemented in the on-
line survey platform Qualtrics, consisting of a short survey for the collection 
of demographic and platform behaviour data, and an exhibit-based test. 
Participants were recruited primarily via popular on-line forums and social 
media communities, such as Reddit, 4CHAN, StumbleUpon, Facebook and 
Twitter, with an online advertisement challenging them to test their ability to 
FIGURE 1 - GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
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detect attacks. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the 
participants. 
 
3.1 User Profile Features 
The survey portion of the experiment required participants to answer a series 
of questions related to their age (A), gender (G), security training (S1, S2, 
S3), platform familiarity (FA), frequency (FR), duration of use (DR), 
computer literacy (CL), security awareness (SA) and education (EDU). These 
features are described below: 
 
 Age. Coded in groups as: 18-24(1), 25-34(2), 35-44(3), 45-54(4), 55-
64(5), 65+(6)  
 G. Gender. 
 S1. Formal computer security education (S1), Coded as a binary 
response. In relation to the terminology used by D. Colardyn and J. 
Bjornavold (2004), S1 is “Formal Learning”.  
 S2. Work-based computer security training (S2). Coded as a binary 
response. In relation to the terminology used in D. Colardyn and J. 
Bjornavold (2004), S2 is “Non-formal Learning”. 
 S3. Self-study computer security training (S3). Coded as a binary 
response. In relation to the terminology used in D. Colardyn and J. 
Bjornavold (2004), S3 is “Informal Learning”. 
 FA. Familiarity with each platform presented in each exhibit, coded 
as: Not very (1), Somewhat (2), Very (3)  
 FR. Frequency of use for each platform presented in the test, coded 
as: Never (1), less than once a month (2), once a month (3), weekly 
(4), daily (5)  
 DR. Duration of use. For each platform category presented in the 
susceptibility test, coded as: None (1), less than 30 mins (2), 30 mins 
to 1 hour (3), 1 to 2 hours (4), 2-4 hours (5), 4 hours+ (6)  
 CL. Computer literacy coded on a scale from 0 to 100 and reported 
by the participants themselves.  
 SA. Security awareness coded on a scale from 0 to 100 and reported 
by the participants themselves.  
 EDU. Level of education, coded as: Less than high school (1), high 
school /GED (2), some college (3), Trade/technical/vocational 
training (4), associate degree (5), Bachelor’s degree (6), Master’s 
degree (7), doctoral degree (8). 
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3.1 Exhibits 
 
The test included four exhibits showing attacks (figures 3, 4, 5 and 6) and four 
exhibits showing normal (non-attack) usage, with an example of these shown 
in figure 7. For the purposes of demonstration, we have added green outlines 
that represent a potentially deceiving visual component of the exhibit and red 
outlines representing visual attack indicators in each attack exhibit. These 
lines were not shown to the participants. The eight attack and non-attack 
exhibits are summarised in table I. 
 
TABLE 1 - ATTACK (A1-A4) AND NON-ATTACK (NA1-NA4) EXHIBITS INCLUDED IN THE TEST 
Exh. Description 
NA1 FB app download from Googleplay, with application permission requirements presented 
NA2 Tweet with shortened URL leading to legitimate search on search engine Startpage 
NA3 Mistyped URL for FB website, leading to the legitimate Facebook login homepage 
NA4 Sponsored tweet with game advertisement on Twitter app, also displaying download 
A1 Twitter phishing website 
A2 Twitter spear phishing email 
A3 Instagram “Qrishing” post that leads to Steam phishing website 
A4 FB malware app on friend’s timeline; requests account permissions with URL redirect 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of participants that identified correctly whether 
each exhibit corresponds to an attack or not. This can also be considered as a 
metric of the difficulty of each exhibit. 
 
FIGURE 2 - PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPANTS THAT IDENTIFIED CORRECTLY WHETHER EACH EXHIBIT 
CORRESPONDS TO A NON-ATTACK (NA1, NA2, NA3, NA4) OR AN ATTACK (A1, A2, A3, A4) 
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Our focus is on achieving prediction of a user’s ability to correctly distinguish 
between attacks and non-attacks. For this, we consider the theoretical ideal 
case, where all features can be utilised (case A), as well as two more 
constrained and more likely future implementations: (case B) as a reliability 
prediction module in a security threat reporting mechanism on a social media 
platform, and (case C) as a mechanism for predicting susceptibility to attacks 
in enterprise environments with extensive monitoring of the users. 
 
Case A: Ideal case with all features 
 
This is the theoretical ideal case, where we predict whether a user will 
correctly detect an attack or non-attack with access to the complete profile of 
a user. 
 
Case B: Report reliability prediction in lightly-monitored social media 
 
Here, we consider the case where the users of a social media platform are 
encouraged to act as human sensors and report security threats when they spot 
them. The social media platform would want to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of each report based on the human sensor’s predicted ability to correctly 
detect attacks (true positives) and avoid mislabeling normal social media 
usage as attacks (false positives). The challenge is that only a few of the 
predictors discussed in Section III are practical. Specifically, it is assumed 
that the social media provider collects data only on frequency and duration of 
use, and can additionally request the user to self-report computer literacy, 
security awareness and platform familiarity. The focus here is on achieving a 
balance between true positive and false positive reports. 
 
Case C: Susceptibility prediction in heavily-monitored enterprise 
environment 
 
Here, we consider the case where the users are employees within an enterprise 
environment. Their organisation is interested in estimating the likelihood that 
they would be deceived by an attack, for instance to determine whether they 
should control their usage of social media, display warnings, recommend 
training etc. The organisation can have access to more input features than in 
case B, including their training history, but for ethical reasons cannot make 
use of protected information, such as age and gender, which were available 
in case A. Also, in this context where there is no reporting, false positives and 
true negatives are of lower importance than true positives and false negatives. 
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FIGURE 3 - EXAMPLE OF TWITTER PHISHING WEBSITE (A1) 
 
FIGURE 4 - EXAMPLE OF A TWITTER PHISHING EMAIL (A2) 
 
 
 9 
FIGURE 5 - EXAMPLE OF INSTAGRAM QRISHING ATTACK AND STEAM PHISHING WEBSITE (A3) 
 
 
FIGURE 6 - EXAMPLE OF MALICIOUS FACEBOOK APP ATTACK (A4) 
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FIGURE 7 - EXAMPLE OF LEGITIMATE TWITTER APP ADVERTISEMENT (NA4) 
 
 
3.2 Prediction Model 
 
The prediction of whether a user will correctly or incorrectly detect an attack 
(or non-attack) is a binary classification problem. Using R (R. Ihaka and R. 
Gentleman, 2016), we have performed forward stepwise logistic regression 
to identify models that can predict a user’s ability to detect attacks and non-
attacks. The forward step selection process is initiated by creating a null 
model, which includes no feature variables and then proceeds to iteratively 
test the addition of each variable in the feature space against a model 
comparison criterion, such as Akaike or Bayes information criterion, Pseudo 
𝑹𝟐 or cross-validation; at each step adding variables to the model that 
improve prediction. This routine is repeated for each variable in the feature 
space until no improvement is achieved. In this study, we have selected 5- 
fold cross-validation to estimate the test error against different numbers of 
predictors. Here, the user sample is partitioned into 5 equal folds. Four folds 
are used to train the model and the remaining fold is used to test the model. 
The process is repeated 5 times so that the model is tested on each fold in 
order to produce an average model test error; which in our case reports model 
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test error at each variable selection step in the forward stepwise process. The 
result of the regression is the selection of those features that have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of a user’s correct 
prediction. For 𝐾 number of features used in the prediction, and a given user’s 
value for each feature 𝑘 ∈ {1, 𝐾} being 𝑋 =  𝑥𝑘, that user’s predicted 
probability of correct detection is given by: 
 
𝑃 ̂ =  
𝑒𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘
 
 
where 𝛽𝑘 is the coefficient of feature 𝑘, as computed by the logistic 
regression. 
 
The three cases (A, B, C) are practically differentiated by their set of features 
𝑋 (and the corresponding coefficients 𝛽𝑘). 
 
In model A, 𝑋 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, 𝐹 𝐴, 𝐹𝑅, 𝐷𝑅, 𝑆𝐴, 𝐶𝐿, 𝐴, 𝐺}.  
In model B, 𝑋 = {𝐹𝐴, 𝐹𝑅, 𝐷𝑅, 𝑆𝐴, 𝐶𝐿}.  
In model C, 𝑋 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝐹𝐴, 𝐹𝑅, 𝐷𝑅, 𝑆𝐴, 𝐶𝐿}. 
 
Following the most common practice in logistic regression, we provide the 
result in the form of 
𝑝
1−𝑝
 odds ratios (OR), where: 
 
𝑂𝑅 =  
?̂?
1 − ?̂?
=  𝑒𝛽0+∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘   
 
 
TABLE 2 - A3 EXHIBIT: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ODDS RATIOS FOR CASES A,B,C. A VALUE ABOVE 1 
INDICATES A SIGNIFICANT PREDICTOR OF CORRECT DETECTION, WHILE A VALUE BELOW 1 
INDICATES A SIGNIFICANT PREDICTOR OF INCORRECT DETECTION 
Case Predictors selected and corresponding odds ratios 
A FA (Steam):1.57, SA:1.01, S3:1.62, G:0.46, FA (Facebook):0.65 
B FA (Steam):1.63, SA:1.01, FR:0.87, DR:0.93, CL:1.001 
C FA (Steam):1.62, SA:1.01, DR (SM):0.81, DR (IM):1.16, FR (SM):0.78, CL:1.01 
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As an example, Table II shows the statistically significant predictors selected 
for one of the exhibits (A3) and the corresponding odds ratios. This is 
interpreted as follows: In case A, the odds of a user correctly identifying A3 
as an attack when all other features of that user’s profile remain fixed is 
increased by 57% for every one-unit increase in the familiarity scale for the 
particular platform (Steam). In cases B and C, this is 63% and 62%, which 
shows that despite the effect of platform habitation (S. Egelman et al., 2008), 
here familiarity is a very useful predictor of a human sensor’s ability to detect 
the particular attack. This agrees with previous results on the importance of 
familiarity with a system as a key enabler of distinguishing between what 
visually looks normal and what is normal behaviour (J. S. Downs et al., 2006; 
J. S. Downs et al., 2007). Also very important is the security self-study (S3) 
feature with an improvement of 62% for every one-unit increase on the self-
study scale if all other features of the user’s profile remain fixed. However, 
this could be used only in the ideal case (A), as whether a user has indeed 
carried out self-study cannot be monitored or confirmed in practice by the 
social media platform (case B) or the user’s employer in an enterprise 
environment (case C). 
 
4 PREDICTION PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
 
Next, we have performed 5-fold cross validation to estimate the prediction 
test error and plot it against the number of predictors utilised. The cross-
validated test error depends on the logit probability threshold cut-off, which 
is effectively the tuning parameter of our prediction model. For case A, figure 
8 summarises the test error against the number of predictors that were added 
with the stepwise approach. In accordance with the generally accepted 
practice in logistic regression (D. W. Hosmer Jr, 2013), the cut-off value is 
chosen to be close to the event rate for each exhibit (i.e., the percentage of 
participants who were correct, as shown in figure 2). We observe that the 
prediction test error is sufficiently low with 2-5 predictors for most of the 
exhibits, and adding further predictors has diminishing returns. This can be 
seen also in Table II, where, although case A had all features available to it, 
the model used only five of them as useful predictors. 
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FIGURE 8 - CASE A: ATTACK (LEFT) AND NON-ATTACK (RIGHT) CROSS-VALIDATION TEST 
ERROR AGAINST NUMBER OF PREDICTOR VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
 
 
 
To evaluate the performance of the models in a more realistic manner, we 
focus on cases B and C. In figure 9 we summarise the overall performance of 
the models for each exhibit in case C the constrained sets of predictors that 
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were chosen via logistic regression for these two cases. We use receiver 
operating characteristic curves to plot average true positive rate against false 
positive rate for different thresholds. The further above of the red diagonal 
line that goes from (0.0) to (1.1) the better the performance. We observe that 
the performance of prediction for non-attacks is rather poor, being close to 
the diagonal line. However, the approach achieves good performance for the 
prediction of three out of four attacks (A1, A2, A3), which would be the 
primary aim of a system predicting the ability of a user to correctly detect an 
attack. 
 
FIGURE 9 -  ROC CURVES FOR PREDICTION PERFORMANCE FOR EACH EXHIBIT IN CASE B (LEFT) 
AND CASE A (RIGHT) 
 
 
As we have designed the measurement of predictor features on a linear scale, 
logistic regression analyses whether the user predictor features reflect a linear 
relationship with attack detection accuracy (e.g., more familiarity and greater 
frequencyof access resulting in a correct attack detection). Whilst the results 
thus far indicate a linear relationship between the features and attack detection 
for a number of attacks, by its nature logistic regression will not reveal non-
linear associations that could lead to better prediction accuracy. 
 
To further evaluate the performance of the logistic regression classifier, using 
Case C, we compare it to Random Forest (RF) classification. Unlike logistic 
regression, RF is a decision tree ensemble algorithm where feature linearity 
and linear interaction between predictors is not presumed; as it employs a 
randomised, nonlinear approach by randomly splitting features’ values at 
each decision boundary to calculate a majority vote (based on support from 
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the data sample) as to whether the split feature value is a correct or incorrect 
detection. RF functions as a bootstrap aggregation algorithm which produces 
replicates of the original data sample by creating new datasets by random 
selection with replacement. With each dataset, multiple new models are 
constructed and gathered to form an ensemble of decision trees. Within the 
prediction process, all of the models in the ensemble are polled and the results 
are averaged to produce a result.  
 
To describe which features are most related to correct detection, RF employes 
a criterion known as variable importance which describes the order in which 
a feature influences the prediction of accuracy of the dependent variable. In 
table 3, the variable importance of each predictor feature is reported for each 
exhibits RF model. It is clear that on average the frequency and duration of 
accessing a social media platform improves the accuracy of whether a user 
will correctly report a social media threat. For exhibit A3 in particular, 
familiarity, frequency, duration, SA and CL are shown to fairly important to 
the prediction outcome, which reveals similarities to the odds ratio reported 
by logistic regression. 
 
TABLE 3 - RANDOM FOREST VARIABLE IMPORTANT (PER FEATURE REDUCED ACCURACY IF 
OMITTED FROM MODEL) 
Feature A1 A2 A3 A4 
SA 48.56 35.23 40.10 1.45 
CL 39.67 29.87 40.79 7.62 
Twitter 12.19 7.99 29.37 -3.52 
FR (Social Media) 41.65 17.13 25.04 16.61 
DR (social Media) 33.84 6.70 24.60 17.82 
Edu 8.62 12.66 12.81 12.71 
S1 10.53 0.11 8.01 -9.28 
S2 10.32 2.97 5.63 7.80 
S3 17.86 11.23 9.64 4.48 
 
 
To compare the performance of the logistic regression and RF models, 
focusing on case C, in 9, we summarise the overall performance of the models 
against exhibits in case C. As before, we use receiver operating characteristic 
curves to plot average true positive rate against false positive rate for different 
thresholds. The test results clearly show that logistic regression outperforms 
RF for all attack exhibits, which provides a convincing argument for the linear 
relationship between the user predictor features analysed in this experiment 
and the user attack detection.  As a result, we can surmise that a user reporting 
high social media platform familiarity, security awareness and computer 
literacy self-efficacy, in general will be more likely to correctly detect an 
attack on that target platform. 
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FIGURE 10 - ROC CURVES FOR PREDICTION PERFORMANCE FOR EACH ATTACK (LEFT) AND NON-
ATTACK (RIGHT) EXHIBIT: LOGISTIC REGRESSION (BLACK) VS. RANDOM FOREST (ORANGE) 
 
 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have presented the results of a large-scale online experiment, measuring 
the performance of users as human sensors of deception-based security 
attacks in social media. In cases B and C, we have demonstrated the utilisation 
of human generated attributes as a practical measure to predict user accuracy 
and credibility of reported semantic attacks against a social media platform; 
identifying consistent performance between a number of attacks across a 
limited set of indicators that are ethical and can be measured automatically 
and in real-time. We have shown that it is feasible to predict to some extent 
users’ ability as detectors of such attacks, which can be highly useful in 
environments where the concept of the human sensor of security threats may 
be considered, including the social media platforms themselves or corporate 
environments where employees use social media. The next stage in this work 
will involve the development of a technical system that can operate in both a 
corporate environment and external independent platform. Future research in 
this field can also investigate the feasibility of using human sensors for 
deception-based attacks in different environments, such as in the context of 
cloud computing (R. Heartfield and G. Loukas, 2013), the Internet of Things 
and cyber-physical systems (G. Loukas, 2015). 
 
Up to now, we have focused on deception-based attacks, where the user is 
deceived into performing a compromising action. However, it is likely that 
the concept of the human sensor can potentially be extended to attacks that 
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do not involve deception. For instance, it is the human users of a website that 
often first notice that a website is experiencing poor availability and their 
reports could complement network monitoring and help speed up denial of 
service detection (E. Gelenbe et al., 2004; G. Loukas and G. Oke, 2007). Also, 
in cyber-physical systems, such as semiautonomous vehicles, the human 
operator is likely to be the first to observe the adverse physical impact of a 
command injection attack (T. Vuong et al., 2015). In the future, we intend to 
extend the scope of this research on human sensors of security threats in terms 
of types of attacks and platforms involved. The aim is by no means to replace 
technical security systems, but to enhance them by leveraging human sensing 
capacity and experience. 
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